Existing quantum key distribution protocols require classical channel and classical authentication procedure. We present an alternative quantum key distribution technique which not only can operate without the requirement of classical channel and classical authentication procedure but also rejects the use of the two. This key distribution technique can act as quantum authentication protocol.
Quantum cryptography [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] and teleportation [7] are the two facets of quantum communication. Of these two, quantum cryptography has been developed out of practical necessity -classical cryptosytems are either secure but impractical or insecure but practical [8] . Around 1970, Wiesner [1] first realised that laws of quantum mechanics can ensure security. In 1984, this radical idea took shape when Bennett and Brassad [2] invented quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. At present many QKD protocols exist; they can be classified as EPR and non EPR protocols. The common aspects of all these protocols are that pure state represents bit values and requirement of classical channel and classical authentication technique [9] . On the other hand, in teleportation [7] quantum state can be sent to a distant location through an EPR channel without sending the state at all. This surprising discovery has added a new dimension to the EPR paradox [10] and produced many theoretical and experimental papers. The common aspects of QKD and teleportation schemes are : both are pure state schemes and both rely on a quantum as well as a classical channel to operate. If we want to authenticate the teleported state, then we have to use classical authentication technique since no quantum authentication technique exists. The presence of classical channel in QKD and teleportation schemes is a long-standing conceptual problem [11] of quantum communications. In this paper we shall show that at least in QKD, this conceptual problem can be removed. This alternative QKD protocol is basically a mixed state protocol because mixed state represents bit values.
The basic idea behind this approach is to produce arbitrarily long sequence of bits randomly choosing the two comparatively short sequences, representing logical 0 and 1. The sequences are shared between the legitimate users.
As an illustration, let us take the two sequences of quantum states :
and S n 1 stand for bit 0 and 1 respectively and n is the total number of states in a sequence. These two sequences S n 0 and S n 1 are shared between sender Alice, and receiver Bob. The key, the sequence of sequences, is :
where N is the number of bits in the key. In the presented protocol, two sequences will be prepared by two different pairs of nonorthogonal states and the density matrices of the two sequences are same i.e. ρ 0 = ρ 1 . This protocol can be used both for two party and multi-party [12, 13] secure communications.
Firstly, we describe the preparation procedure of the two shared sequences. Suppose, in a secret place, Alice and Bob are given 2n number of horizontally polarized (|↔ ) incoherent photons. They divide the photons into two halves to produce two sequences. To produce S n 0 , they split the wave function of each of the n photons with a symmetric (50:50) beam splitter. Now they do one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin, and if the result is "head", unitarily rotates the polarization by 90
• (|↔ s −→ | s ) and if "tail" she does nothing (|↔ s −→ |↔ s ). In the other path, called r, they do nothing (|↔ r −→ |↔ r ). The states are :
To produce S n 1 , similarly after splitting the state of each of the remaining n photons, they do one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin; if "heads", unitarily rotates by 45
• (|↔ s −→ |ր ւ s ) and if "tail", unitarily rotates by 135
• (|↔ s −→ |տ ց s ). Similarly in the other path r, they do nothing. The states are :
These states can be represented by the following base states:
In this basis, the density matrix of the two sequences is,
Now they are separated. Let us think that Alice transmits a single bit, either S n 0 or S n 1 . Bob's task is to identify the bit. Bob can independently identify the bit value in different ways since he knows the preparation codes of both types of possible bits. Whatever be the identification processes, Bob's objective is to find out the correlation of results of measurements with the shared sequences. In this protocol, we shall use conclusive which path information to identify the bit value.
In this method, Bob uses two sets of dual analyzers (DA) on the two resulting paths. The orientations of DA are : i) DA 0 = {0
• : 0
where " √ " and " × " stand for " yes" and " no" results respectively. The probabilities of these three kind of results for the four different superposition states are given in table 1 and 2 considering the statistical weight of the states and orientations of the dual analyzers. The results α and β provide which-path (W P ) information and the result γ gives no-path (N P )information. But mere W P information is not enough to identify the state. Bob needs which-path of which-state (W P W S) information. The result α does not give any W P W S information for any of the above two settings of DA. The N P information of result γ is always inconclusive for any settings of the DA. The only result β provides conclusive W P W S information for proper choice of above two settings of DA. The W P W S information conclusively determines the state |ψ 1 for DA 0 and the state |φ 1 for DA 1 .
As Bob does not know the bit value in advance, he always uses both sets of DA. Bob, tossing coin, uses any of the two sets of DA against each event. The measurements yield two sets of random results. As an illustration, suppose the sequences of results are: R 0 ={α α β α β α γ γ....} and R 1 = {β α α α γ γ α β....}, where R 0 and R 1 are the sequences of results when Bob used DA 0 and DA 1 respectively. Firstly, Bob discards inconclusive results from both the sets. So the reduced sequences are: R The first bit is completely secure due to the indistinguishability principle of differently prepared same density matrix. But they have to create large number of bits (at least more than the shared data). So they have to use the same two shared sequences again and again. But repetitive use means eavesdropper's gain of information. Therefore, Eve, the eavesdropper, intercepting all the sequences of an arbitrarily long key, can get full information of the two sequences correlating the results of randomly coming sequences and send the cloned key to Bob. Of course, full information of the two sequences are not required, Eve can decipher the key by using marginal statistics. In favor of eavesdropping, it is assumed that Eve uses very fast superlaminal signal to compensate the long time delay caused by her measurements. At this point, it seems that the advantage of uncertainty principle (measurement creates unavoidable disturbances) is lost. In the next sections, we shall discuss that the advantage of uncertainty principle can be taken by simple strategy.
To exploit uncertainty principle, Alice will not send any new sequence, until she is confirmed by Bob that he has got her previous sequence. If Eve intercepts a sequence fully or partially, she is bound to introduce error when she will resend the sequence to Bob. But the question is how Bob will inform. If he uses authenticated classical channel, some additional shared secret bits will be needed to authenticate Bob's classical information. It means that security of created bits can be ensured if more bits than created bits can be shared ! This is unrealistic. So classical channel and classical authentication technique can not be used in this approach. For authentication following feedback technique can be taken. If bits are successfully received by Bob, he can send them back to Alice using the same two shared sequences. Alice following similar measurements can know that bit has reached to Bob. If Eve intercepts, she will introduce error when she resend the sequence to Bob. Becoming aware of eavesdropping, Bob can send totally depolarised photons to make Alice aware about interception. But Eve may not intercept sequence transmitted by Alice, she can only intercepts Bob's generated sequence in the feedback phase. Then also sequence will be corrupted to Alice. For both situations, Alice will stop transmission. Here, single bit interception will be considered as total jamming of the channel that Eve can always do for all sorts of communications. In this way bit by bit security can be achieved.
Secure message distribution. Secret message distribution [12, 13] is one of the important task of cryptography. The purpose is to distribute a key secretly to two or many receivers to make them mutually dependent on each other to access the full information. Hillery et al [12] first realised that within existing quantum cryptographic procedure, three (GHZ state) or multi particle entanglement property can be used to accomplish this task in a single operating system. Of course two separately operating cryptosystems can be used to accomplish this task. In a single operating system, without using any entanglement property, the above protocol can be extended to perform this task. To elucidate, suppose there are two receivers, Bob and Sonu, in the two resulting paths, where Bob is on the path r and Sonu on the path s and both of them share the sequences to be used to generate the key with Alice. Notice that, only s is the bit-carrying path. So Sonu independently can identify the bits, but Bob can not. Bob always gets the same truncated state |↔ r . To give equal opportunity to Bob, Alice can make the path r as bit-carrying path. The states are:
For sake of Bob, Alice can prepare bits/sequences (Bob shares the preparation procedures) with these new superposition states. Due to this action, both of them are in similar position. Now if Alice randomly selects paths to encode the sequences, both of them will get 50% bits. So they have to co-operate to access the full key.
Splitting the state vector into many paths and making every path as bitcarrying path at random, the protocol can be extended to distribute information among many users. As for example, the states can be split into three parts r, s and t for three receivers as follows,
The same density matrix of the sequence of states ψ 1 and ψ 2 (1:1) and the sequence of states φ 1 and φ 2 (1:1) in the representation R corresponding to the base states: Here bit-carrying path is t, so only receiver on path t will get the bit. If Alice randomly changes the bit-carrying path giving equal importance to each path, then each of the three receivers will get 33.33% bits of the key.
For security, receivers have to feedback each bit to sender to authenticate the quantum channel following previously discussed quantum authentication technique. But who will feedback ? Who will get the bit, she/he will feedback. In the above three and multi party protocols, receivers can independently identify bits, so they may not be interested to co operate with others. The protocols can be easily extended to force the receivers mutually dependent on each others to identify each bit.
In the all the above protocols, states are mutually non orthogonal and density matrices of the two sequences are same. The mutual nonorthogonality and equivalence of density matrix are the most powerful combination for this alternative key distribution. Suppose two random sequences, having same density matrix, are prepared by two different orthogonal states. Example: |↔ , | and |տ ց , |ր ւ . in this protocol, intercepting sequence, Eve will not get the bit value but may evade detection. On the other hand, if density matrices are not same but states are non orthogonal then Eve can get the bit value from the single sequence but can not evade detection. If two criteria are imposed i.e. density matrices are same and states are non orthogonal, then Eve will not get the bit value still she will introduce error. The system is extremely sensitive. As if system stops the bank robber as soon as he proceeds towards the bank. In contrast, in the existing protocols eavesdropping is being detected only after leakage of some of the bit values. We think, this particular protocol completely quantum, powerful, and most sensitive crypto-system. So far we have assumed a noise-free environment. In noisy situation, following this key distribution technique, full security can be achieved by suitable error introduction strategy [14] . 
